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Executive	  Summary	  
 
1.  Americans cast their ballots in three main ways: at a traditional neighborhood polling place 
on election day; early, in person at a government office or voting center; and absentee, which is 
usually submitted early by mail. The proportion of all ballots cast by the latter two methods 
continues to rise steadily. 
 
2.  The introduction and expanded use of convenience (absentee and early) voting does not seem 
to have increased voter turnout. 
 
3.  Because they generally take place before election day, both absentee and early voting 
complicate late changes in ballots. 
 
4.  Compared with traditional and early voting, absentee voting results in more lost votes. It is 
more susceptible to two types of problems for voters and officials: errors that result in higher 
ballot rejection rates and less security in the voting process To minimize these concerns, we 
recommend early voting as a preferable way to increase voter convenience. 
 
5.  In many cases, absentee-voting rule changes that might reduce one problem arguably 
exacerbate the other, so there is no clear optimal set of procedures for absentee voting in regard 
to such matters as submission deadlines or voter validation methods. 
 
6.  Some standardization in absentee-voting rules, however, should be relatively uncontroversial. 
We conclude with several suggestions for best practices. Facilitate fast delivery of absentee 
requests by offering many means for making requests. Provide postage for returning absentee 
ballots by mail, and cautiously consider other means for transmitting absentee ballots. Favor 
traditional election day voting over early voting, and prioritize early voting over absentee voting. 
Encourage voters to check the status of their absentee ballots before election day. Avoid 
counting ballots before election day.  
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Introduction	  
 
 Because the U.S. Constitution grants states substantial latitude in how to conduct 
elections, a wide variety of practices have developed. This diversity is especially clear in regard 
to absentee voting. The rules governing absentee balloting have generally liberalized over time, 
contributing to rising usage in recent years, though not all states have followed this pattern. The 
purpose of this report is to review what is known about absentee voting, identify some key policy 
choices available to the states, and offer a few tentative recommendations. 
 The rise of absentee and early voting represents a tremendous change in U.S. election 
administration, perhaps the biggest since the adoption of the secret ballot and voter registration a 
century ago. As recently as the 1980s, fewer than 5% of ballots were cast before election day. 
That number quickly escalated over the next two decades. In the November 2012 election, 31% 
of all ballots were cast early; of these, 55% were submitted by mail.1 This exodus from 
traditional election-day polling places represents a remarkable shift in how American elections 
are conducted, and the implications of this change are not yet widely recognized or fully 
understood. 
 Absentee voting is widespread, popular, and essential for ill, institutionalized, and 
disabled individuals. It is likely here to stay, but there are some disconcerting implications of so 
much voting taking place on an absentee basis. In particular, absentee ballots are less secure, 
more expensive, often confusing, cumbersome to prepare and process, and less likely to be 
counted. We encourage states to exercise caution before expanding absentee voting. Insofar as 
they wish to lengthen the voting period, there are reasons to favor early voting. There are, as 
well, arguments for striving to improve the experience of traditional election-day voting in lieu 
of expanding election day into election week(s) in the interest of convenience. 
 
The	  Absentee	  Voting	  Environment	  
 
 Absentee voting in the US began when Civil War soldiers in the field were offered a way 
to vote back home. Absentee voting for civilians arrived at the same time as the secret ballot—
around 1900—and was initially limited to those with a prescribed set of reasons for being away 
from home on election day.2 Only decades later did states begin loosening the requirements for 
absentee voting. California led in 1978, and the number of “no-excuse” states tripled between 
1980 and 1996.3 As more states provided the opportunity, the practice gained in popularity, and 
the national trend has been a steady rise in the proportion of all ballots cast on an absentee basis. 
 Definitions of terminology are necessary to understand the variety of regimes across the 
states.4 By absentee voting we mean a system in which a voter may request that a ballot be sent 
in advance of election day and then may submit that ballot either by mail or in person. Every 
state has some form of absentee ballot. In 21 states the absentee-ballot request must be 
accompanied by an excuse, such as being unable to get to the polls due to disability, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 November 2012 Current Population Survey. 
2 John C. Fortier. 2006. Absentee and Early Voting: Trends, Promises, and Perils. Washington, DC: AEI Press.  
3 Nathan Cemenska, Jan E. Leighley, Jonathan Nagler, and Daniel P. Tokaji. 2009. “Report on the 1972-2008 Early 
and Absentee Voting Dataset.” Report to the Pew Charitable Trusts. 
4 For more detail see: Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller, and Daniel Toffey. 2008. 
“Convenience Voting.” Annual Review of Political Science 11:437-55. Christopher B. Mann. “Mail Ballots in the 
United States: Policy Choice and Administrative Challenges.” In The Measure of American Elections, ed. Charles 
Stewart III and Barry C. Burden. Forthcoming at Cambridge University Press. 
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confinement, or religious obligation.5 Another 27 states do not require a reason for the request. 
Eight states also permit voters to join a permanent absentee list, negating the need for repeated 
ballot requests in future elections. At least seven other states offer permanent absentee status 
selectively, to those with disability or illness. Requests may be submitted in a variety of ways, 
but absentee ballots themselves must usually be submitted by mail.6  
 Absentee voting differs from true early voting, though the two are often jointly classified 
as alternative forms of convenience voting.7 Early voting allows for in-person voting in advance 
of election day, usually at central locations or early-vote centers. It differs in timing, but not 
form, from traditional voting. By contrast, some states now use vote-by-mail systems, and have 
discontinued centralized, in-booth voting entirely. Oregon and Washington began to experiment 
with vote-by-mail in the late 1980s and then later switched to exclusive by-mail voting—after 
the passage of a 1998 ballot initiative in Oregon and in most counties of Washington after 1993. 
A vote-by-mail system automatically distributes ballots by mail to voters, allowing them to 
return them by mail or drop them off at central locations before or on election day. At least 17 
states permit mail voting for local or special elections. While it is sometimes treated as different 
in kind from absentee voting, in logistical terms, vote-by-mail is essentially absentee voting with 
automatic permanent absentee status for all voters.8 
 States vary in the deadlines required for absentee ballots to be counted. As of the 2012 
election, 33 states required the absentee ballot to arrive by election day, 4 states required ballots 
to arrive before election day, and 13 states plus D.C. required that ballots be postmarked by 
election day.9 In most cases, then, absentee voters make their choices earlier than election-day 
voters, with the same advantages and disadvantages from voluntarily truncating the campaign 
season as experienced by early voters. 
 In about 15 states, absentee-ballot requests can be made by a third party, that is, someone 
other than the individual who is entitled to complete and cast the ballot; even more states allow 
third parties to return those ballots.10 While most states do not provide pre-paid postage for 
return of absentee ballots, a few do. In some states the postage policy differs by locality. There 
are many further distinctions across jurisdictions in regard to implementation of absentee voting, 
including aspects such as how many envelopes are used and how voter identity is established.  
 Figure 1 shows the percentage of ballots cast as absentees in each state the 2012 
election.11 All-mail Oregon and Washington were high outliers, and there is much variation 
across the remainder of the country. Many states have absentee rates below 10%, but a few have 
rates above 30%. There is no typical state when it comes to absentee voting. 
 
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 National Conference of State Legislatures. “Absentee and Early Voting.” Updated May 28, 2013. Colorado 
becomes the third mail balloting state on July 1, 2013. Note that Mann’s chapter reports slightly different numbers. 
6 This report is limited to analysis of domestic civilian ballots. Different rules govern absentee voting by military 
and overseas civilians. 
7 Media and popular discussion often confuse the issue when they use the shorthand “early voting” to describe any 
balloting that takes place before election day. 
8 Confusing matters, Oregon and Washington both retain an absentee procedure for domestic civilians even while 
their normal ballots are now absentee except in name. 
9 See http://www.longdistancevoter.org/absentee_ballot_deadlines 
10 Cemenska et al. 2009. 
11 Mail ballots in Oregon and Washington are treated as absentee ballots for purposes of comparison in the figure. 
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Figure	  1.	  State	  Absentee	  Balloting	  Rates	  in	  the	  2012	  Election	  
  
 States with comparatively low levels of absentee voting include some that do not permit 
early, in-person voting and thus see nearly all ballots cast in the traditional fashion on election 
day (e.g. New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and others that have relatively high rates of early voting 
(e.g. Arkansas, Tennessee). States such as Florida and North Dakota have fairly high levels of 
both absentee and early voting.12 To clarify these distinctions, Figure 2 shows what proportion of 
ballots were cast early, but not absentee, and absentee (by domestic civilians only) for each state 
in the 2010 midterm election. There is some re-ordering of the states experiencing the highest 
levels of absentee voting, but the pattern is similar to that in the presidential-election year of 
2012. About half the states had rates near 10% (or lower) both years. Clearly, many states have 
resisted the trend of liberalizing use of absentee balloting, even while others have gone all in for 
convenience. Potential voters in different states thus encounter quite different voting options. In 
many states, voting still means turning up at a neighborhood polling place on election day for 
almost everyone. In other states, many voters have never seen a polling place.  
 
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 States have tended to expand either absentee or early voting rather than both, but there are exceptions. See Charles 
Stewart III. 2011. “Adding Up the Costs and Benefits of Voting by Mail.” Election Law Journal 10:297-301.  
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Figure	  2.	  Absentee	  and	  Early	  Voting	  Rates	  by	  State,	  2010	  General	  Election	  
Source: 2010 EAVS. Absentee rates cover domestic civilian voters only. The data shown in figures 1 and 2 do not 
always match official reports from Secretaries of State, and are not definitive, given the difficulty of standardizing 
definitions across the diverse state systems. Some of the early-voting rates of 0 for 2010 reflect missing data. 
 
The effects of absentee (and early) voting on overall voter turnout resist easy description. 
Some studies find modest positive effects of absentee voting availability on voter participation, 
but others find no relationship or even negative effects.13 Although absentee balloting is often 
promoted on the basis that it increases participation levels, there is no consensus that it delivers 
on that promise. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Paul Gronke and Peter Miller. 2012. “Voting by Mail and Turnout in Oregon: Revisiting Southwell and Burchett.” 
American Politics Research 40: 976-997. Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler. 2009. “The Effects of Non-Precinct 
Voting Reforms on Turnout.” Report to the Pew Charitable Trusts. Jeffrey A. Dubin and Gretchen A. Kalsow. 1996. 
“Comparing Absentee and Precinct Voters: A View over Time.” Political Behavior 18:369-92. Barry C. Burden, 
David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Donald P. Moynihan. Forthcoming. “Election Laws, Mobilization, and 
Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform.” American Journal of Political Science. Adam J. 
Berinsky. 2005. “The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States.” American Politics Research 
33:471-91. J. Eric Oliver. 1996. “The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and Party Activity on Absentee Voting and 
Overall Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science 40:498-513. Mary Fitzgerald. 2005. “Greater Convenience 
but not Greater Turnout: The Impact of Alternative Voting Methods on Electoral Participation in the United States.” 
American Politics Research 33:842-67. 
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Challenges	  and	  Concerns	  for	  Voters	  and	  Administrators	  
 
In the remainder of this report we highlight some important concerns about absentee 
voting for both voters and election administrators. We do not, at this stage, try to estimate the 
prevalence of any of these problems. Hence, this is a list of “possible problems” rather than 
“common problems” or “problems, in order of seriousness.” 
Implementing absentee voting creates some challenges unique to voting in advance of 
election day. It also exacerbates or modifies some other difficulties already present for traditional 
election-day voting. Despite the great variation across the states in how absentee voting is 
conducted, there are essential features of the process that create challenges for administrators or 
potential worries for voters: 
• Requesting, receiving, and returning ballots in advance, from afar, increases the 
possibility of loss or delay. 
• Voter validation, however done, must take place at the time of request for the 
absentee ballot and at time of receipt of the ballot, increasing the transaction 
time/costs and possibilities for error by administrators. 
• Because the voter is (generally) not present at the time the ballot is processed by 
officials, mistakes or ambiguities about intent and eligibility cannot usually be 
communicated to the voter or remedied. Protecting the anonymity of vote choices 
requires somewhat complicated, error-producing procedures such as use of multiple 
envelopes. Such protection is imperfect. 
• The absentee request and the ballot must be prepared far enough in advance of 
election day to permit dissemination and return (often by ordinary mail), pushing 
forward deadlines. 
• Because absentee ballots are counted later than traditional ballots in many states, they 
contribute to delays in the resolution of elections and may contribute to public 
suspicions about election integrity. The late arrival of absentee ballots interacts with 
the other concerns to make legal disputes both before and after the election more 
likely. 
 
Issues of Security and Voter Access 
 
As in other areas of election administration, the election official faces a tension between 
maintaining the security of the voting process and ensuring voter access. Put more simply, the 
administrator’s problem is one of balancing the competing goals of minimizing fraud and 
avoiding the erroneous rejection of valid votes.  
 Vote fraud, like election crimes more generally, is thought by most observers to be fairly 
rare, but also potentially difficult to detect. To the degree it occurs, the absence of secrecy and 
the added difficulty of verifying the identity of the voter make absentee voting a natural locus of 
such activity.14 Bailey catalogued nine federal election fraud court cases from 2000-2005, at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Adam Liptak. “Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises.” New York Times, October 6, 2012. U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission. “Election Crimes: An Initial Review and Recommendations for Future Study.” 
December 2006. Washington, DC. 
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five of which involved absentee ballots.15 Alvarez and Boehmke found few fraud cases involving 
absentee ballots in the 1994-2003 period in California (13/1285) but a comparatively higher 
fraction in Georgia between 1999-2003 (100/273).16 A comprehensive analysis by an 
investigative journalism program found 491 alleged cases of absentee ballot fraud since 2000. Of 
these, only 103 were accusations against voters (rather than campaign representatives and 
election officials) and relatively few resulted in convictions.17 However, in a 2012 survey, among 
respondents in the nine states with more than 30% absentee ballot usage shown in Figure 1, 12% 
answered that “people [in your county or city] voting an absentee ballot intended for another 
person” is “very common” and another 20% thought it happens occasionally. Only 25% thought 
it never happens, so where absentee voting is common, the public, rightly or wrongly, holds 
some suspicions about the integrity of the process.18 
Identity-related fraud would include multiple voting by individuals appearing on 
registration lists multiple times and usurpation of ballots by individuals other than the registered 
voter whose ballot is being cast. Absentee voting makes both easier. By contrast, voting by 
ineligible individuals, such as non-citizens or felons whose right to vote has not been restored, is 
not necessarily any easier via absentee ballots. Someone in possession of an absentee ballot can 
also easily complete it in the presence of another interested party in exchange for payment, or 
can sign the ballot and turn it over to another person for completion. In short, facilitating large-
scale absentee voting jeopardizes the secrecy that was deliberately brought into the American 
electoral arena in the late Nineteenth Century to curtail intimidation of voters and fraud. 
 Measures intended to reduce the possibility of fraud and/or to protect the anonymity of 
the vote generally make voting more difficult and lead to a higher rate of rejected ballots. States 
vary considerably in the details of how absentee ballots are cast. Examples of stages in the 
validation process include matching names, addresses, and signatures from registration forms 
and absentee envelopes, verifying that witnesses are valid (e.g. also registered voters from the 
same state or notaries public), confirming that the individual did not also cast an in-person ballot 
and did not die in between completing the ballot and election day, and receiving the ballot on 
time (e.g. with a postmark no later than some date or having been delivered by a particular time 
and date). Optimal procedures would minimize rejection of valid votes because of official errors, 
such as ruling that two slightly different signatures do not match or simply overlooking a name 
listed in the registration rolls. Ultimately, discretion is inevitable.  
It is difficult to study variation in how such rules are enforced. Only in recounts of 
extremely close elections is there generally such close scrutiny that variation becomes salient and 
well documented. One observer of the recount of the 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate election 
pitting Norm Coleman against Al Franken conclude that, “There was one standard state law, one 
set of rules, but there were many ways that election officials from Ada to Zumbrota executed that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Delia Bailey. 2008. “Caught in the Act: Recent Federal Election Fraud Cases.” In Election Fraud: Detecting and 
Deterring Electoral Manipulation (R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Susan D. Hyde, eds.) Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 89-98.  
16 R. Michael Alvarez and Frederick J. Boehmke. 2008. “Correlates of Fraud: Studying State Election Fraud 
Allegations.” Alvarez et al., eds, 99-111. 
17 http://votingrights.news21.com/interactive/election-fraud-database/. See also Lorraine C. Minnite. 2010. The Myth 
of Voter Fraud. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
18 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections, question 29. Note that perceptions of “People pretending 
to be someone else when going to vote” in the seven of these states that also have traditional voting (i.e. excluding 
Washington and Oregon) are only slightly better, with 11% having chosen “very common,” 16% “occasionally,” 
18% “infrequently”, 36% “never” and 20% “don’t know.” 
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standard.”19 In that instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s solution for dealing with absentee 
ballots that were initially rejected for unclear reasons was to permit counting of those votes that 
both campaigns and local officials agreed had been improperly rejected, even though “improper 
rejection of an absentee ballot envelope is not within the scope of errors subject to correction.”20 
Generally, the implementation standard that the exact law should always be followed has strong 
appeal on equal-treatment and rule-of-law grounds, but may be naïve, and is sometimes rejected 
as a normative goal by judges and analysts if there is evidence of disparate impact of procedural 
requirements on, say, racial groups. In short, absentee ballots add significantly complexity and 
ambiguity into the recount process. 
Confusion is heightened when an absentee voter shows up at an election-day polling 
place to vote. To ensure that the voter does not cast two ballots, but is also not erroneously 
prevented from voting at all, many states provide these voters with provisional ballots. In these 
cases it is often difficult to separate intentional voting crimes from mistakes or confusion, and 
implementation of provisional-ballot programs poses its own difficulties, discussed in a separate 
white paper. Here we merely point out that legal disputes about how to treat these provisional 
ballots is a symptom of the absentee ballot process. 
 Absentee voting separates the voter from the casting of her ballot, which can be 
problematic. First, the anonymity of the ballot may be lost. In most states a poll worker or 
election official is responsible for opening absentee ballots and depositing them in the voting 
machine. It is thus impossible to ensure complete privacy of the vote choices for an individual 
absentee voter. Ballots are sometimes unable to be fed into tabulation machines, because they 
have been bent or incorrectly completed, leaving the voter’s intent unclear. For a traditional voter 
these problems are easily remedied by a poll worker providing a replacement ballot or offering 
guidance on how to complete the ballot. When a voter “overvotes” by choosing too many options 
for a given contest or “undervotes” by skipping some contests, many jurisdictions now use 
machines that automatically alert the election-day voter. For an absent voter, such correction 
cannot take place.  
 States and localities differ significantly in why and how often they reject absentee ballots. 
Figure 3 shows the rates of absentee ballot rejection from the 2012 election.21 In most states less 
than 2% of absentee ballots go uncounted. But in a few states one in 20 or even one in 10 
absentee ballots is rejected. Generally speaking, states with higher rates of absentee ballot usage 
have lower rejection rates. According to the EAVS, nationwide the top reason for rejecting these 
ballots was a missed deadline (approximately 35% of all rejected absentees). Next most common 
was a missing voter signature (21%), followed by a non-matching voter signature (10%), a 
missing witness signature (8%), duplication (i.e. also having voted in person) (5%), and a host of 
less common reasons such as voter death and unsealed envelopes. Whereas a non-matching 
signature and double voting are potentially serious concerns, they are not especially common. 
The top problems are in fact bureaucratic complications that might be mitigated with more 
information or a simpler process.  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Jay Weiner. 2010. This is Not Florida: How Al Franken Won the Minnesota Senate Recount. 
Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 25.	  
20 Norm Coleman, et al., Petitioners vs. Mark Ritchie, Minnesota Secretary of State, et al., Respondents, A08-2169. 
21 This is computed by dividing the number of rejected absentee ballots by the number submitted by voters for 
counting. Technically it represents the weighted average of localities in a state. Other calculations produce slightly 
different estimates. See Mann chapter or the Pew Charitable Trust’s Election Performance Index (pewstates.org/epi). 
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Figure	  3.	  State	  Absentee	  Ballot	  Rejection	  Rates	  in	  the	  2012	  Election	  
	  	  
Large majorities of absentee voters report that they had no problems casting their ballots. 
At the same time, most are also unaware of whether their ballots were ultimately counted or 
rejected. Voters will not necessarily know if their absentee ballot went astray, unless the error 
occurs in the initial phases (i.e., a request is lost or the ballot is lost on its way to the voter). In 
the 2012 SPAE, about 10% of respondents claimed not to have voted. Of these, about 6% said 
that a “major” factor in their abstention was “I requested but did not receive an absentee ballot.” 
Another 5% said that an unmet absentee-ballot request was a “minor” factor.22 A best practice 
recommended by a recent Pew study calls for states to provide lookup tools for voters to check 
on the status of absentee and provisional ballots. In 2010 roughly 29 states permitted voters to do 
this; it is unclear to what degree this tool was advertised to voters.23 
At least some voters do seem to be aware that absentee ballots face more opportunities 
for rejection. In 2012, for example, the percentage of voters saying they were “very confident” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 2012 SPAE, question 2. Note that all SPAE respondents are chosen for interview because they say they are 
registered to vote, hence the high turnout rate.	  
23 Pew Charitable Trusts. 2011. “Being Online Is Still Not Enough: Reviews and Recommendations for State 
Election Officials.” http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/being-online-is-still-not-enough-85899376525 
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that their ballots would be counted as they intended was 64% of for those who voted on election 
day or early in-person but only 55% for absentee voters.24  
 Such concerns are sensible in light of the multiple actions the voter and election officials 
must undertake for an absentee ballot to be cast. A voter usually has to request the absentee 
ballot and then, after receiving it, entrust it to the U.S. Postal Service for delivery. A local 
election official must process the request, send out the ballot, and then process the ballot when it 
returns, assuming it was delivered promptly. Ramsey County Election Manager Joe Mansky 
reported to the Minnesota state legislature that absentee ballots requires 22 steps to process and 
costs $7.28 per voter whereas early voting has only 9 steps and costs $3.80 per transaction.25 
University of Florida Professor Daniel Smith has documented how the more complicated 
absentee voting process in Florida contributed to higher ballot rejection rates and longer lines in 
the 2012 election.26 
Postage costs for returning absentee ballots can be onerous, ambiguous, and unclear to 
voters, and expensive for states that provide them. An alternative to offsetting postage costs 
would be exploiting technology to bypass physical mail. We would caution against large-scale 
switching to online submission without careful study. Technological advances may ultimately 
make the multi-stage swapping of paper by mail obsolete, but vote security is too important to 
make hasty use of technologies that open up entirely new challenges and potential problems. 
Early moves towards touch-screen voting included some missteps that hampered post-election 
audits using “paper trails.”27 Online distribution and submission of ballots would be seem to be 
subject to numerous potentially grave problems.  
 Absentee ballots can also lengthen the amount of time it takes to count and certify the 
vote. Some states permit counting of absentee ballots as they arrive rather than waiting until 
election day or later.28 The desire to “get a jump” on the counting is understandable, but is also 
raises concerns about information from early counts affecting how subsequent voters act. And 
even if states with advance counting, late-arriving ballots create problems. After election day 
2012, several races in Arizona had yet to be called for two weeks after election day because 
administrators lacked time to go through the many steps required to process all of the mail 
ballots delivered too late to be counted ahead of time.29 Much of the delay in Arizona was also 
caused by the processing of provisional ballots given to election-day voters who had previously 
signed up for the state’s permanent absentee list.30 Vote counting in California was delayed for 
similar reasons. In San Diego County counting and certifying took weeks. With late-arriving 
mail ballots the county registrar “must confirm each voter’s registration status, compare each 
voter’s signature on the envelope with the signature on the registration form to verify that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 2012 SPAE, question 25. Lower confidence among absentee voters holds even after accounting for other factors 
such as education, age, race, and sex. See R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, Morgan Llewellyn. 2008. “Are 
Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted?” Journal of Politics 70:754-66. 
25 James Nord, “Most States Have Both Early and No-Excuse Absentee Balloting, but Not Minnesota,” MinnPost, 
June 17, 2013. 
26 http://electionsmith.wordpress.com/2012/11/06/the-functional-differences-between-early-voting-and-in-person-
absentee-ballots-in-florida/ 
27 See, e.g., Paul S. Herrnson. 2008. “Paper Trails, Cryptography and Other Approaches to Vote Verification.” 
Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 18(3): 657-664. 	  
28 National Association of Secretaries of State Survey, August 2012. 
29 Bob Christie. “Ariz. Secretary of State Proposes Vote-Counting Overhaul.” Associated Press. November 18, 
2012. 
30 Michelle Ye Hee Lee. “Arizona Counties Eye Early-Voting List Overhaul.” Arizona Republic. January 13, 2013.  
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voter was he or she said, and verify that the voter did not cast a ballot elsewhere.”31 In a close 
election, the processing of absentee (and provisional) ballots becomes a prime target for 
litigation from the candidates, political parties, and other groups. 
 With absentee ballots “lost” votes are an acute concern. The complicated pipeline is 
inefficient and provides many opportunities for ballots to “leak” from the system, a concern for 
both voters and administrators. Charles Stewart contends that there are twice as many 
opportunities for lost ballots compared to voting in person. He also estimates in one election that 
21% of all ballot requests were lost somewhere along the way.32 Presumably submitted absentee 
ballots are also lost, further increasing the number. And absentee ballots have a higher “residual 
vote” rate, meaning that they are counted as valid ballots less frequently. A study of California’s 
recent election shows that the benefits of improving voting technology have been entirely offset 
by loses induced by the rise in absentee voting.33 The treatment of ballots might also be uneven 
across groups. Absentee ballots submitted by language minority voters and by those on the 
permanent absentee list were less likely to be counted.34 
 Handling of absentee ballots by third-party actors, a practice permitted in some states, 
raises additional concerns about chain of custody and fidelity to a voter’s wishes. For good 
reason, the Baker-Carter Commission on Federal Election Reform recommended that states 
prohibit a third party (other than an approved family member) from handling absentee ballots.35 
When a friend, neighbor, administrator, representative from a campaign or party, or even a 
stranger offers to assist with the absentee-ballot process, the voter’s sovereignty may be 
jeopardized. Unlike in-person voting, this happens outside the supervision of election officials. A 
malicious intervener might try to coerce the voter, alter her vote, or fail to deliver a ballot request 
or the ballot itself. Even a well-meaning assistant complicates absentee voting by adding another 
step and another set of hands to the process, increasing the likelihood of a ballot being damaged 
or lost. The “permanent absentee” system presents a unique concern in lower turnout midterm 
election when many ballots are sent automatically but relatively few are returned, leaving a large 
number of floating ballots ripe for abuse.36 
 
Issues Related to Timing 
 
 A distinct set of concerns arises when problems with ballots are discovered after they 
have been printed. The simplest cases stem from simple printing or design errors. These are 
potentially a problem for any ballot, whether absentee or not. An added concern for 
administrators where absentee- and/or early- voting is permitted is that the dates for finalizing 
ballots are pushed forward. Because absentee voting normally involves extra paraphernalia, such 
as a security envelope, there are also slightly higher odds of some mistake that slows or 
complicates processing. In the raft of news stories about printing mistakes in the November 2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 “Editorial: News Flash – County Elections Finally Over.” San Diego Union-Tribune. December 7, 2012. 
32 Charles Stewart III. 2010. “Losing Votes by Mail.” New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
13:573-602. 
33 R. Michael Alvarez, Dustin Beckett, and Charles Stewart III. Forthcoming. “Voting Technology, Vote-by-Mail, 
and Residual Votes in California, 1990-2010.” Political Research Quarterly. 
34 R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Betsy Sinclair. 2008. “Whose Absentee Votes are Returned and Counted: 
The Variety and Use of Absentee Ballots in California.” Electoral Studies 27:673-83. 
35 http://www1.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/CFER_summary.pdf 
36 See Mann chapter. 
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election season were accounts of problems with absentee ballots in Florida, Ohio, Utah, and 
Washington.37 
 More serious still are changes made necessary by late-breaking events. A study of mail 
voting in the 2008 California presidential primary found that many absentee votes were cast for 
candidates who withdrew before primary election day and presumably would have gone to vote 
for candidates who were still in the race had the ballots been cast later.38 In October 2002, 
incumbent Minnesota Senator and candidate Paul Wellstone died in a plane crash. Less than two 
weeks before election day, the Democratic-Famer-Labor (DFL) Party selected former Vice 
President Walter Mondale to replace Wellstone, and officials began to prepare supplemental 
ballots showing Mondale’s name instead of Wellstone’s. However, thousands of voters had, at 
that point, already cast absentee ballots showing Wellstone as the DFL nominee for that office. 
Minnesota law forbade officials from issuing replacement ballots to those who had already 
submitted their ballots. In Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer the state Supreme Court subsequently struck 
down those statutory provisions, while nonetheless reiterating that absentee voting is a privilege 
rather than a right. In legal terms, that means that statutes such as those intended to prevent fraud 
enjoy “rational basis” deference rather than being subject to “strict scrutiny.”39  
 One could argue that everyone who completes a ballot early should always know that 
regret is a potential risk. In that view, late changes in the options are different in degree, but not 
kind, from any late developments that might alter candidates’ respective appeals.   
One more example of ballot issues illustrates how early voting can add to the challenges 
of remedying problems. In October of 2008, a Cook County Circuit judge found the wording of a 
ballot item on whether or not to hold a constitutional convention in Illinois was “misleading,” 
and “inaccurate.”40 While his initial decision seemed to suggest that all ballots should be 
reprinted with different wording, the judge subsequently permitted a compromise wherein a 
separate supplement was distributed along with the ballot showing the defective item. The state’s 
resistance to reprinting was based in part on cost, but another factor was the fact that by the time 
the wording was deemed inappropriate some absentee ballots had already been distributed.  
 
Conclusions	  
 
 Absentee voting is an essential civic lifeline for the elderly and disabled communities. It 
is also necessary for diplomats, civilians living abroad, and many active-duty military voters. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Andy Reid. 2012. “Printing Error Mars Palm Beach County Absentee Ballots.” Sun Sentinel, October 11, 2012 
(retried June 20, 2013 from http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-10-11/news/fl-ballots-problem-palm-
20121011_1_absentee-ballots-absentee-voters-elections-supervisor-susan-bucher). Joe Pagonakis. 2012. “45,000 
Cuyahoga County Mail-In Ballots Could Cause Some Confusion; Print Shop Error To Blame.” NewsNet5.com 
(retrieved June 20, 2013 from http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/money/consumer/troubleshooter/cuyahoga-county-
mail-in-ballot-causes-some-confusion-print-shop-error-to-blame). Dennis Romboy. 2012. “Printing Error Slows 
Utah County Absentee Ballot Scanning.” Deseret News, Tuesday October 30, 2012 (retrieved June 20, 2013, from 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865565685/Printing-error-slows-Utah-County-absentee-ballot-
scanning.html?pg=all). Kim Bradford. 2012. “New Ballots Going to 1,422 Pierce County Voters After Printing 
Error.” News Tribune, October 22, 2012 (retried June 20, 2013 from 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2012/10/22/2341246/new-ballots-going-to-1422-pierce.html). 
38 Marc Meredith and Neil Malhotra. 2011. “Convenience Voting Can Affect Election Outcomes.” Election Law 
Journal 10:227-53. 
39 Elizabeth M. Brama. 2003. “Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer: Minnesota’s Absentee Voting Laws Following the Sudden 
Death of Incumbent Candidate Paul Wellstone.” William Mitchell Law Review 30:397-425. 
40 See Chicago Bar Association v. White, No. 1-08-2741. 898 N.E.2d 1101 (2008). 
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These communities are discussed in separate reports to the Commission. We would not deny of 
these populations the opportunity to vote absentee. State should continue to facilitate absentee 
voting for those who need it.  
 For voters outside the special populations mentioned above, we encourage the promotion 
of in-person voting, whether through early voting or traditional election-day polling places. 
These options provide lower cost, less confusion and litigation, more security, and fewer lost and 
rejected votes. As Mann’s analysis summarizes, “The increase in mail ballot related problems 
will continue until mail ballot usage becomes large enough to motivate” change in 
administration, yet “permanent vote-by-mail and postal voting…should not be seen as a panacea. 
There is no guarantee that other states will match this performance if they adopt these mail 
voting systems.”41 
 It would be helpful for states to coordinate on a common set of rules for when absentee 
ballots are due, but most aspects of voting in America’s robustly federal environment will remain 
under control of states and localities, making standardization unlikely.  
 Many of the key choices about how to implement absentee voting involve tradeoffs of the 
sort we sketched above. There are compelling arguments for giving priority to either of the goals: 
preventing fraud or assisting voters. Later deadlines for submission can reduce rejection rates, 
but at the cost of slowing the final tabulation and declaration of winners. Permanent absentee 
status can streamline the process, reducing stages when errors can arise, but it also creates the 
worrisome norm of many “live” unwanted ballots being in circulation. We thus regard many of 
the debates about how best to design absentee-voting systems as ongoing, and do not pretend to 
have adjudicated on which features are optimal.  
The important point is this: compared to early voting, absentee balloting has the potential 
to make the problems of both security and access more acute, increasing the chances for both 
election crimes and false rejection of valid votes. Recognizing this concern, we conclude with a 
short list of recommendations that should generate little controversy. 
 
• Because missed deadlines appear to be a major factor in rejection of absentee ballots, 
expediting the process should be a priority. Of the three stages in the absentee process 
– ballot requests, ballot distribution, and ballot return – the first seems the safest and 
most promising for using technology to simplify and speed up the process. Requests 
for absentee ballots should be accepted by a variety of means including mail, phone, 
fax, electronic mail, and Internet web sites. States that do not do so should consider 
providing pre-paid postage so that voters may return absentee ballots by mail without 
additional personal expense. The potential for online submission of absentee ballots 
should be studied, but also approached with caution.  
• Without endorsing excuse-only absentee voting, we reiterate that early voting 
involves fewer risks and is a preferable system for the general voting population.  
Early voting shares those special challenges associated with altering the timing of 
election day, but avoids concerns originating in the potential losses of secrecy and 
anonymity from absentee voting. Early voting is no panacea—with a small number of 
centralized voting locations, it can be difficult to make voting equally easy for all, and 
the convenience level is generally lower than that of absentee voting. But, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Mann chapter in Stewart and Burden book manuscript. 
	   Burden and Gaines – Absentee Ballots – page 15 
election-day voting, it keeps the voter with his ballot, thus minimizing confusion, 
error, some forms of fraud, and legal disputes after election day. 
• States should facilitate and encourage after-the-fact checking by absentee voters to 
determine whether their ballots were accepted and counted. Even if the information is 
made available only after the election, so that it would not allow for foiled voters to 
try to correct errors, better information about rejection can serve to educate voters 
about the procedures and to make obvious some of the costs in reduced likelihood of 
being counted that accompany the benefit of convenience.  
• Some states permit tallying of absentee ballots in advance of election day while 
forbidding any release of the vote totals. As the number of absentee ballots grows, 
this choice is an understandable means to reduce the waiting time for announcing 
results after voting is concluded. However, this practice is risky and we urge officials 
not to count any ballots until election-day voting is concluded. Even simple early 
turnout rates are already much discussed in reference to guesses about which 
campaigns are doing better at getting out the (early) vote.  
 
 
